/* Symmetric stream AEAD cipher based on KMAC
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2022 - 2026, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
 *
 * License: see LICENSE file in root directory
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
 * DAMAGE.
 */

/******************************************************************************
 * Abstract
 *
 * This specification defines a symmetric stream cipher algorithm using
 * the authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) approach. This
 * algorithm can be used to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary user data.
 * The cipher algorithm uses the KMAC algorithm to generate a key stream
 * which is XORed with either the plaintext (encryption) or ciphertext
 * (decryption) data. The KMAC is initialized with the user-provided key
 * and the user-provided IV. In addition, a second KMAC instance is
 * initialized which calculates a keyed-message digest of the ciphertext to
 * create a message authentication tag. This message authentication tag is used
 * during decryption to verify the integrity of the ciphertext.
 *
 * 1. Introduction
 *
 * This specification defines a symmetric stream cipher algorithm using
 * the authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) approach. This
 * algorithm can be used to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary user data.
 *
 * The base of the algorithm is the generation of a key stream using KMAC
 * which is XORed with the plaintext for the encryption operation, or with
 * the ciphertext for the decryption operation.
 *
 * The algorithm also applies an Encrypt-Then-MAC by calculating a message
 * authentication tag using KMAC over the ciphertext. During decryption, this
 * calculated message authentication tag is compared with the message
 * authentication tag obtained during the encryption operation. If both values
 * show a mismatch, the authentication fails and the decryption operation is
 * terminated. Only when both message authentication tags are identical
 * the decryption operation completes successfully and returns the decrypted
 * message.
 *
 * The key along with the IV are used to initialize the KMAC algorithm
 * for generating the key stream. The first output block from the KMAC
 * is used to initialize the authenticating KMAC instance used to
 * calculate the message authentication tag.
 *
 * The size of the key is defined to be 256 bits when using KMAC-256.
 * The size of the IV can be selected by the caller. The algorithm supports
 * any IV size, including having no IV.
 *
 * As part of the authentication, the algorithm allows the addition of
 * additional authenticated data (AAD) of arbitrary size. This AAD is inserted
 * into the authentication KMAC instance during calculating the message
 * authentication tag.
 *
 * 2. KMAC-based AEAD Cipher Algorithm
 *
 * 2.1 Notation
 *
 * The KMAC-hash denotes the KMACXOF256 function [SP800-185]. The KMAC-hash
 * has 4 arguments: the key K, the main input bit string X, the requested output
 * length L in bits, and an optional customization bit string S.
 *
 * The inputs to the KMAC-hash function are specified with references to these
 * parameters.
 *
 * 2.3. Common Processing of Data
 *
 * KMAC-Crypt(key, IV, input data) -> output data, auth key
 *
 * Inputs:
 *   key: The caller-provided key of size 256 bits
 *
 *   IV: The caller-provided initialization vector. The IV can have any size
 *	 including an empty bit-string. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the
 *	 IV, however.
 *
 *   input data: The caller-provided input data - in case of encryption, the
 *               caller provides the plaintext data, in case of decryption,
 *               caller provides the ciphertext data.
 *
 * Outputs:
 *   output data: The resulting data - in case of encryption, the ciphertext
 *                is produced, in case of decryption, the plaintext is returned.
 *   auth key: The key that is used for the KMAC operation calculating the
 *             message authentication tag.
 *
 * The common processing of data is performed as follows:
 *
 * input length = size of input data in bits
 * KS = KMAC(K = key,
 *           X = "",
 *           L = 256 bits + input length,
 *           S = IV)
 * auth key = 256 left-most bits of KS
 * KS crypt = all right-most bits of KS starting with the 256th bit
 * output data = input data XOR KS crypt
 *
 * 2.3 Calculating of Message Authentication Tag
 *
 * KMAC-Auth(auth key, AAD, ciphertext, taglen) -> tag
 *
 * Inputs:
 *   auth key: The key that is used for the KMAC operation calculating the
 *             message authentication tag.
 *
 *   AAD: The caller-provided additional authenticated data. The AAD can have
 *	  any size including an empty bit-string.
 *
 *   ciphertext: The ciphertext obtained from the encryption operation or
 *               provided to the decryption operation.
 *
 *   taglen: The length of the message authentication tag to be generated.
 *
 * The calculation of the message authentication tag is performed as follows:
 *
 * tag = KMAC(K = auth key,
 *            X = AAD || ciphertext,
 *            L = taglen,
 *            S = "")
 *
 * 2.4. Encryption Operation
 *
 * KMAC-Encrypt(key, IV, plaintext, AAD, taglen) -> ciphertext, tag
 *
 * Input:
 *   key: The caller-provided key of size 256 bits
 *
 *   IV: The caller-provided initialization vector. The IV can have any size
 *	 including an empty bit-string.
 *
 *   plaintext: The caller-provided plaintext data.
 *
 *   AAD: The caller-provided additional authenticated data.
 *
 *   taglen: The length of the message authentication tag to be generated.
 *
 * Output
 *   ciphertext: The ciphertext that can exchanged with the recipient over
 *               insecure channels.
 *
 *   tag: The message authentication tag that can be exchanged with the
 *        recipient over insecure channels.
 *
 * The encryption operation is performed as follows:
 *
 * ciphertext, auth key = KMAC-Crypt(key, IV, plaintext)
 * tag = KMAC-Auth(auth key, AAD, ciphertext, taglen)
 *
 * 2.5 Decryption Operation
 *
 * KMAC-Decrypt(key, IV, ciphertext, AAD, tag) -> plaintext, authentication result
 *
 * Input:
 *   key: The caller-provided key of size 256 bits
 *
 *   IV: The caller-provided initialization vector. The IV can have any size
 *	 including an empty bit-string.
 *
 *   ciphertext: The ciphertext that was received from the send over
 *               insecure channels.
 *
 *   AAD: The caller-provided additional authenticated data.
 *
 *   tag: The message authentication tag that was received from the send over
 *        insecure channels.
 *
 * Output
 *   plaintext: The plaintext of the data.
 *
 *   authentication result: A boolean indicator specifying whether the
 *			    authentication was successful. If it was
 *			    unsuccessful the caller shall reject the ciphertext.
 *
 * The decryption operation is performed as follows:
 *
 * plaintext, auth key = KMAC-Crypt(key, IV, ciphertext)
 * taglen = size of tag
 * new_tag = KMAC-Auth(auth key, AAD, ciphertext, taglen)
 * if (new_tag == tag)
 *   authentication result = success
 * else
 *   authentication result = failure
 *
 * If the authentication result indicates a failure, the result of the
 * decryption operation SHALL be discarded.
 *
 * 3. Cryptographic Aspects
 *
 * The KMAC AEAD algorithm is a stream cipher which uses the XOR-construction
 * method to perform encryption and decryption. This method is susceptible to
 * attacks when the key stream is identical between different encryption
 * operations. This this case, the key stream can be trivially removed and
 * thus a decryption of the data is possible as follows:
 *
 * ciphertext 1 = plaintext 1 XOR KS
 *
 * ciphertext 2 = plaintext 2 XOR KS
 *
 * ciphertext 1 XOR ciphertext 2 =
 * 	(plaintext 1 XOR KS) XOR (plaintext 2 XOR KS) =
 *	plaintext 1 XOR plaintext 2
 *
 * Thus, the security of the KMAC algorithm is based on the property that
 * the key stream KS is unique for different encryption operations. The key
 * stream is derived from the key and the IV using KMAC. In common use cases,
 * the key may not be able to be modified. Yet, the IV can be modified. Common
 * protocols allow the generation of a new IV during encryption and transmit
 * the IV to the decryptor. Thus, the IV can be used as a diversifier to for
 * the different encryption operations to obtain a different key stream.
 *
 * As the KMAC algorithm's IV size is unspecified in size, the KMAC
 * algorithm can handle any size that may be pre-defined by the use case or
 * protocol consuming the KMAC AEAD algorithm.
 *
 * Considering the avalanche effect of the underlying KECCAK algorithm, even
 * a small IV may result in a completely different keystream rendering the
 * aforementioned attack impossible.
 *
 * The IV is not required to be a confidentially-protected value. It can be
 * communicated in plaintext to the decryptor. This is due to the fact that
 * the IV is used together with the key to generate the key stream using KMAC.
 * An attacker is not able to construct either the key or the key stream by
 * only possessing the IV. Furthermore, the key is defined to possess a
 * cryptographic meaningful entropy (see section 2.3) which implies that the
 * IV does not need to deliver additional entropy to ensure the strength of
 * the KMAC AEAD algorithm.
 *
 * It is permissible that the IV is generated either by a random number
 * generator or using a deterministic construction method. The only requirement
 * is that the probability in generating a key / IV collision is insignificantly
 * low. This implies that considering the IV is only a diversifier for the
 * key stream, and the fact that the IV is not required to be private, the
 * random number generator is not required to possess a cryptographic meaningful
 * strength.
 *
 * The selection of KMAC for generating the keystream is based on the
 * statement in [SP800-185] declaring Keccak is usable as a pseudorandom
 * function.
 *
 * The approach of Encrypt-Then-MAC is selected based on the analysis of
 * [AUTHENC] table 3 considering on the finding that the MAC algorithm of KMAC
 * is strongly unforgeable.
 *
 * 4. Normative References
 *
 * [AUTHENC] Mihir Bellare and Chanathip Namprempre, Authenticated Encryption:
 *	     Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition
 *	     Paradigm
 *
 * [SP800-185] John Kelsey, Shu-jen Chang, Ray Perlne, NIST Special Publication
 *             800-185 SHA-3 Derived Functions: KMAC, CSHAKE, TupleHash and
 *             ParallelHash, December 2016
 ******************************************************************************/

#include "alignment.h"
#include "build_bug_on.h"
#include "compare.h"
#include "cpufeatures.h"
#include "fips_mode.h"
#include "lc_kmac_crypt.h"
#include "lc_memcmp_secure.h"
#include "math_helper.h"
#include "ret_checkers.h"
#include "timecop.h"
#include "visibility.h"
#include "xor.h"

#define LC_KC_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_SIZE (256 >> 3)

static int lc_kc_setkey_nocheck(void *state, const uint8_t *key, size_t keylen,
				const uint8_t *iv, size_t ivlen);
static void lc_kc_selftest(void)
{
	LC_FIPS_RODATA_SECTION
	static const uint8_t in[] = {
		FIPS140_MOD(0x00),
		0x01,
		0x02,
		0x03,
		0x04,
		0x05,
		0x06,
		0x07,
		0x08,
		0x09,
		0x0a,
		0x0b,
		0x0c,
		0x0d,
		0x0e,
		0x0f,
		0x10,
		0x11,
		0x12,
		0x13,
		0x14,
		0x15,
		0x16,
		0x17,
		0x18,
		0x19,
		0x1a,
		0x1b,
		0x1c,
		0x1d,
		0x1e,
		0x1f,
		0x20,
		0x21,
		0x22,
		0x23,
		0x24,
		0x25,
		0x26,
		0x27,
		0x28,
		0x29,
		0x2a,
		0x2b,
		0x2c,
		0x2d,
		0x2e,
		0x2f,
		0x30,
		0x31,
		0x32,
		0x33,
		0x34,
		0x35,
		0x36,
		0x37,
		0x38,
		0x39,
		0x3a,
		0x3b,
		0x3c,
		0x3d,
		0x3e,
		0x3f,
	};
	LC_FIPS_RODATA_SECTION
	static const uint8_t key[] = {
		0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
		0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13,
		0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d,
		0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
		0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31,
		0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b,
		0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f,
	};
	static const uint8_t exp_ct[] = {
		0x32, 0x26, 0x28, 0x44, 0xf4, 0x08, 0x27, 0x4a, 0x75, 0xf9,
		0x84, 0xbb, 0x4f, 0x31, 0x67, 0x81, 0x38, 0xc6, 0x41, 0xe5,
		0x04, 0x26, 0x01, 0xda, 0xdb, 0x6c, 0x0b, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0xc1,
		0x63, 0x46, 0x1c, 0xf2, 0x31, 0x30, 0xb8, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x53,
		0x39, 0x49, 0x99, 0x98, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x70, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x1e,
		0x7a, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x1f, 0xaf, 0xa1, 0x3a, 0x6b, 0x18, 0x1a,
		0x44, 0x99, 0xda, 0x28
	};
	LC_FIPS_RODATA_SECTION
	static const uint8_t exp_tag[] = {
		0x28, 0x43, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x1f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x41, 0xd7,
		0x5c, 0xdd, 0x7f, 0xc5, 0x96, 0x32, 0x8b, 0xd9, 0x5a, 0xe3,
		0x72, 0xe2, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x83, 0xd1, 0x85, 0xa3, 0xc5, 0xab,
		0x83, 0xe0, 0x51, 0x89, 0x98, 0x34, 0xf1, 0x8f, 0x94, 0xcc,
		0x98, 0xa9, 0xe2, 0x79, 0x07, 0xb2, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x68, 0x4d,
		0x53, 0xaa, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x73, 0xa8, 0xec,
		0xf2, 0xfa, 0x79, 0x31
	};
	uint8_t act_ct[sizeof(exp_ct)] __align(sizeof(uint32_t));
	uint8_t act_tag[sizeof(exp_tag)] __align(sizeof(uint32_t));

	LC_SELFTEST_RUN(lc_kmac_aead->algorithm_type);

	LC_KC_CTX_ON_STACK(kc, lc_cshake256);

	if (lc_kc_setkey_nocheck(kc->aead_state, key, sizeof(key), NULL, 0))
		goto out;
	lc_aead_encrypt(kc, in, act_ct, sizeof(in), in, sizeof(in), act_tag,
			sizeof(act_tag));
	if (lc_compare_selftest(lc_kmac_aead->algorithm_type, act_ct, exp_ct,
				sizeof(exp_ct), "KMAC AEAD encrypt"))
		goto out;
	if (lc_compare_selftest(lc_kmac_aead->algorithm_type, act_tag, exp_tag,
				sizeof(exp_tag), "KMAC AEAD tag"))
		goto out;
	lc_aead_zero(kc);

	if (lc_kc_setkey_nocheck(kc->aead_state, key, sizeof(key), NULL, 0))
		goto out;
	lc_aead_decrypt(kc, act_ct, act_ct, sizeof(act_ct), in, sizeof(in),
			act_tag, sizeof(act_tag));

out:
	lc_compare_selftest(lc_kmac_aead->algorithm_type, act_ct, in,
			    sizeof(in), "KMAC AEAD decrypt");
	lc_aead_zero(kc);
}

static int lc_kc_setkey_nocheck(void *state, const uint8_t *key, size_t keylen,
				const uint8_t *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *kmac = &kc->kmac;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *auth_ctx = &kc->auth_ctx;
	int ret;

	/* Timecop: The key is sentitive. */
	poison(key, keylen);

	/*
	 * The keystream block size should be a multiple of the KMAC block
	 * size, as otherwise the filling of it is inefficient.
	 */
	BUILD_BUG_ON(LC_SHA3_256_SIZE_BLOCK % LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK);
	BUILD_BUG_ON(LC_KC_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_SIZE > LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK);

	CKINT(lc_kmac_init(kmac, key, keylen, iv, ivlen));

	/*
	 * Generate key for KMAC authentication - we simply use two different
	 * keys for the KMAC keystream generator and the KMAC authenticator.
	 */
	CKINT(lc_kmac_final_xof(kmac, kc->keystream, LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK));
	CKINT(lc_kmac_init(auth_ctx, kc->keystream,
			   LC_KC_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_SIZE, NULL, 0));

	/* Set the pointer to the start of the keystream */
	kc->keystream_ptr = LC_KC_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_SIZE;

out:
	return ret;
}

static int lc_kc_setkey(void *state, const uint8_t *key, size_t keylen,
			const uint8_t *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
	lc_kc_selftest();
	LC_SELFTEST_COMPLETED(lc_kmac_aead->algorithm_type);

	return lc_kc_setkey_nocheck(state, key, keylen, iv, ivlen);
}

static void lc_kc_crypt(void *state, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
			size_t len)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *kmac;

	kmac = &kc->kmac;

	while (len) {
		size_t todo = min_size(len, LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK);

		/* Generate a new keystream block */
		if (kc->keystream_ptr >= LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK) {
			/*
			 * Return code check irrelevant - output size sufficient
			 */
			lc_kmac_final_xof(kmac, kc->keystream,
					  LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK);

			kc->keystream_ptr = 0;
		}

		todo = min_size(todo,
				LC_KC_KEYSTREAM_BLOCK - kc->keystream_ptr);

		if (in != out)
			memcpy(out, in, todo);

		/* Perform the encryption operation */
		xor_64(out, kc->keystream + kc->keystream_ptr, todo);

		len -= todo;
		in += todo;
		out += todo;
		kc->keystream_ptr += todo;
	}
}

static int lc_kc_add_aad(void *state, const uint8_t *aad, size_t aadlen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *auth_ctx;

	auth_ctx = &kc->auth_ctx;

	/* Add the AAD data into the KMAC context */
	lc_kmac_update(auth_ctx, aad, aadlen);

	return 0;
}

static int lc_kc_encrypt_tag(void *state, uint8_t *tag, size_t taglen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *auth_ctx;
	int ret;

	if (taglen < 8)
		return -EINVAL;

	auth_ctx = &kc->auth_ctx;

	/* Generate authentication tag */
	ret = lc_kmac_final_xof(auth_ctx, tag, taglen);
	if (ret < 0)
		lc_memset_secure(tag, 0, taglen);

	/* Timecop: Tag is not sensitive. */
	unpoison(tag, taglen);

	/* Re-initialize the authentication context for new message digest */
	lc_kmac_reinit(auth_ctx);
	return ret;
}

static int lc_kc_decrypt_authenticate(void *state, const uint8_t *tag,
				      size_t taglen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	uint8_t calctag[128] __align(sizeof(uint64_t));
	uint8_t *calctag_p = calctag;
	int ret;

	if (taglen > sizeof(calctag)) {
		ret = lc_alloc_aligned((void **)&calctag_p, sizeof(uint64_t),
				       taglen);
		if (ret)
			return ret;
	}

	/*
	 * Calculate the authentication tag for the processed. We do not need
	 * to check the return code as we use the maximum tag size.
	 */
	CKINT(lc_kc_encrypt_tag(kc, calctag_p, taglen));

	CKRET_HARDENED(lc_memcmp_secure(calctag_p, taglen, tag, taglen),
		       -EBADMSG);

out:
	lc_memset_secure(calctag_p, 0, taglen);
	if (taglen > sizeof(calctag))
		lc_free(calctag_p);

	return ret;
}

static int lc_kc_encrypt(void *state, const uint8_t *plaintext,
			 uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t datalen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *auth_ctx;

	auth_ctx = &kc->auth_ctx;

	lc_kc_crypt(kc, plaintext, ciphertext, datalen);

	/* Timecop: ciphertext is not sensitive regarding side channels. */
	unpoison(ciphertext, datalen);

	/*
	 * Calculate the authentication MAC over the ciphertext
	 * Perform an Encrypt-Then-MAC operation.
	 */
	lc_kmac_update(auth_ctx, ciphertext, datalen);

	return 0;
}

static int lc_kc_decrypt(void *state, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
			 uint8_t *plaintext, size_t datalen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;
	struct lc_kmac_ctx *auth_ctx;

	auth_ctx = &kc->auth_ctx;

	/*
	 * Calculate the authentication tag over the ciphertext
	 * Perform the reverse of an Encrypt-Then-MAC operation.
	 */
	lc_kmac_update(auth_ctx, ciphertext, datalen);
	lc_kc_crypt(kc, ciphertext, plaintext, datalen);

	/* Timecop: plaintext is not sensitive regarding side channels. */
	unpoison(plaintext, datalen);

	return 0;
}

static int lc_kc_encrypt_oneshot(void *state, const uint8_t *plaintext,
				 uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t datalen,
				 const uint8_t *aad, size_t aadlen,
				 uint8_t *tag, size_t taglen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *cc = state;
	int ret;

	/* Insert the AAD */
	CKINT(lc_kc_add_aad(state, aad, aadlen));

	/* Confidentiality protection: Encrypt data */
	CKINT(lc_kc_encrypt(cc, plaintext, ciphertext, datalen));

	/* Integrity protection: KMAC data */
	CKINT(lc_kc_encrypt_tag(cc, tag, taglen));

out:
	return ret;
}

static int lc_kc_decrypt_oneshot(void *state, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
				 uint8_t *plaintext, size_t datalen,
				 const uint8_t *aad, size_t aadlen,
				 const uint8_t *tag, size_t taglen)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *cc = state;
	int ret;

	/* Insert the AAD */
	CKINT(lc_kc_add_aad(state, aad, aadlen));

	/*
	 * To ensure constant time between passing and failing decryption,
	 * this code first performs the decryption. The decryption results
	 * will need to be discarded if there is an authentication error. Yet,
	 * in case of an authentication error, an attacker cannot deduct
	 * that there is such an error from the timing analysis of this
	 * function.
	 */
	/* Confidentiality protection: decrypt data */
	CKINT(lc_kc_decrypt(cc, ciphertext, plaintext, datalen));

	/* Integrity protection: verify MAC of data */
	CKINT_HARDENED(lc_kc_decrypt_authenticate(cc, tag, taglen));

out:
	return ret;
}

static inline void lc_kc_zero(void *state)
{
	struct lc_kc_cryptor *kc = state;

	if (!kc)
		return;

	lc_kmac_zero(&kc->auth_ctx);
	lc_kmac_zero(&kc->kmac);
	kc->keystream_ptr = 0;
	lc_memset_secure(kc->keystream, 0, sizeof(kc->keystream));
}

LC_INTERFACE_FUNCTION(int, lc_kc_alloc, const struct lc_hash *hash,
		      struct lc_aead_ctx **ctx)
{
	struct lc_aead_ctx *tmp = NULL;
	int ret;

	if (!ctx)
		return -EINVAL;

	ret = lc_alloc_aligned((void **)&tmp, LC_KMAC_CRYPT_ALIGNMENT,
			       LC_KC_CTX_SIZE);
	if (ret)
		return ret;

	LC_KC_SET_CTX(tmp, hash);

	*ctx = tmp;

	return 0;
}

static const struct lc_aead _lc_kmac_aead = {
	.setkey = lc_kc_setkey,
	.encrypt = lc_kc_encrypt_oneshot,
	.enc_init = lc_kc_add_aad,
	.enc_update = lc_kc_encrypt,
	.enc_final = lc_kc_encrypt_tag,
	.decrypt = lc_kc_decrypt_oneshot,
	.dec_init = lc_kc_add_aad,
	.dec_update = lc_kc_decrypt,
	.dec_final = lc_kc_decrypt_authenticate,
	.zero = lc_kc_zero,
	.algorithm_type = LC_ALG_STATUS_KMAC_CRYPT,
};
LC_INTERFACE_SYMBOL(const struct lc_aead *, lc_kmac_aead) = &_lc_kmac_aead;
