### abstract ###
previous research demonstrates overestimation of rare events in judgment tasks  and underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience
the current paper presents three laboratory experiments and a field study that explore this pattern
the results suggest that the overestimation and underweighting pattern can emerge in parallel
part of the difference between the two tendencies can be explained as a product of a contingent recency effect  although the estimations reflect negative recency  choice behavior reflects positive recency
a similar pattern is observed in the field study  immediately following an aversive rare-event i e   a suicide bombing people believe the risk decreases negative recency but at the same time exhibit more cautious behavior positive recency
the rest of the difference is consistent with two well established mechanisms  judgment error and the use of small samples in choice
implications for the two-stage choice model are discussed
### introduction ###
studies of human reaction to low probability rare events reveal an interesting difference between judgment and decision-making in repeated settings
judgments probability estimations appear to reflect over-sensitivity to rare events
that is  the estimated probability of events that occur with probability below  NUMBER   NUMBER  tends to be higher than the objective probability  CITATION
on the other hand  decision-making from experience tends to reflect underweighting of insensitivity to rare events  CITATION
that is  decision-makers behave as if events that occur with probability below  NUMBER   NUMBER  occur with smaller probability than their objective probability
the apparent discrepancy is important in light of the two-stage choice model  CITATION  which assumes that choice can be predicted from estimated probabilities
